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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 07-1931
________________
EUGENE H. HEWLETT,
            Appellant
 v.
LYNNE ABRAHAM; 1ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT; EVAN SILVERMAN,
Office of District Attorney of Philadelphia, PA;
MICHAEL J. KELLY, Office of Public Defender; POLICEMAN
LOUIS POLICEMAN, BADGE NUMB #2360; POLICEMAN LEONARD ZITO,
BADGE NUMB 4898; POLICEMAN JOHN DOE, Badge UNK of The
Philadelphia Police Dept.; OFFICE OF PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT
ATTORNEY; THE PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cv-2864)
District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin
____________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)or
Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 26, 2007
Before:  BARRY, AMBRO and FISHER, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Filed: August 6, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
2Appellant Eugene H. Hewlett appeals pro se from the District Court’s order
dismissing his civil rights action as untimely and the District Court’s subsequent order
denying his motion for reconsideration.  Hewlett’s complaint arises out of his conviction
for aggravated assault in 1985 and his overnight detention in March 2003 for the alleged
purchase of a firearm as a felon.  We need not repeat the details of Hewlett’s claims here
as they are well-known to the parties and are summarized in the District Court’s
memorandum.  In brief, Hewlett enumerates what he believes were various constitutional
problems with his arrest and 1985 trial.  Hewlett further contends that he was falsely
imprisoned in 2003 because his incarceration was based on the prior improper 1985
felony conviction.  We also read Hewlett’s complaint as alleging that the Philadelphia
District Attorney engaged in malicious prosecution and subjected him to double jeopardy
with respect to the 2003 incarceration.  Hewlett seeks millions of dollars in damages.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because Hewlett is
proceeding in forma pauperis, we must analyze the appeal for possible dismissal pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), we must dismiss an appeal if it is
frivolous.  An appeal may be dismissed as frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or
fact.  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
To the extent Hewlett complains of constitutional problems with his 1980s arrest,
prosecution, trial, and sentencing, those claims are clearly time-barred as the events
complained of occurred more than twenty years ago.  See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331,
348 n.13 (3d Cir. 1989) (Pennsylvania’s two-year limitations period for personal injury
1In any event, most of these claims would be barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994).
3
actions is applicable in section 1983 actions).1  Further, the District Court properly
concluded that Hewlett’s false imprisonment claim was time-barred because it is
undisputed that Hewlett was released on March 3, 2003, and failed to file suit until more
than two years later in June 2006.  See id.; see also Wallace v. Kato, 127 S. Ct. 1091,
1096 (2007) (statute of limitations begins to run against an action for false imprisonment
when the alleged false imprisonment ends).
Hewlett’s malicious prosecution claim likewise fails because prosecutors are
immune from a civil suit for damages under section 1983 for initiating a prosecution and
presenting the State’s case.  See Bartle, 871 F.2d at 343 (prosecutors are absolutely
immune from civil liability for activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of
the criminal process”) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)).  See also
Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463-64 (3d Cir. 1992) (decision to initiate a
prosecution is at the core of a prosecutor’s judicial role).  Hewlett’s double jeopardy
claim is frivolous given that the charge for which he was allegedly wrongfully
incarcerated was ultimately dismissed for lack of prosecution.
For these reasons, we will dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
